Introduction
Since its founding by Samuel Hahnemann some two hundred years ago, homeopathy has accomplished many impressing achievements, such as innumerable curing of diseases, individually as well as in epidemics, popularity among millions of patients all over the world, political successes, professionalization and institutiona lization, an d scientific research, from case studies and clinical trials to basic laboratory research. Nevertheless, recognition and fu ll appreciation by conventional medicine is still lacking.
How can this paradox be explained, how can it be resolved? Th e thesis I am suggesting in my presentation is that conventional med icine's rejecti on of homeopathy's claim of being a scientific medicine stems mainly from an inaccurate understanding of the scope, prospects, and limits of science and its appropriate status in our lives. On the other hand, if we actually ta ke t he scien ces as tool s for cognition and practice, rather than as authorities forcing us to subdue ourselves under an all-embracing world-view that t hey are supporting, and if we radicalize their approach to the point where they have to reveal t heir own presuppositions and restricted validity, we may regain a fresh and uncaged look upon reality.
Theory of medicine
Let us start with the most certain and undisputed fact among homeopaths. Homeopaths are practicing homeopathy, are th ey not? But what does this mean, what are they actually doing?
The usual e~nswer given by conventional medicine, the science closest and yet most uncomprehending towards homeopathy, reads like this: homeopaths are not using material medical subst ances, but ultramolecular dilusions instead, they do not prescribe according to conventional diagnoses based on objectifying technologies, but accordi ng to subject ive complaints and patients' idiosyncrasies, and instead of trying to remove material causes of diseases, th ey treat according to the principle of sim ilars, which cannot be considered scientific. Since clinical trials conforming with the gold standards of evidence based medicine, such as randomized double-blind studi es, generally do not show a significant difference between homeopathic treatment and placebo therapy, conventiona l medical science simply concludes that homeopaths are practicing placebo th erapy. This statement, howeve r, can not be co nsidered scientific, as long as it conceals its own presuppositions and limiting framework.
Correctly stated it should read : Under the prem ise of materi alism and the quantitative statistical method, neither homeopathy nor placebo therapy can adequately be assessed and understood, because obviously they are phenomena escaping the conventional set of scientific categories.
Th is rebuke of ungrounded claims and pretensions by conventional medicine, however, should not be misunderstood as a refusal of the modern scientific method at large. Th e method of systematic observation, measurement, and experiment , and th e formulation, testing, and modification of hypotheses, as it is successfully performed in physics, chemistry, as well as in medicine, proves to be ve ry efficient and nobody would like to abandon their achievements. The only, but crucial problem is that these positives become undermined by a dark and threatening side for humanity, when its instrumental function is forgotten and the whole world, including our lives, wou ld be considered to be nothing more than w hat scientists ca n measure and show us on t heir tables.
In quantum physics, the most sophisticated and consistent branch of natural sciences, the scientific approach has long ago arrived at the point where t he basic assumptions of modern sciences, their naive realism, objectivism, and materialism, have proved to be untenable. Instead of still hoping to find out w hether " reality" essentially consists of particles or waves, scient ists can show that t he act of measurement, rather than detecting allegedly objective entities, leads to a collapse of t he system as a whole and constitutes and fixes not more than a man-made image of the world. If the scientist asks nature particle questions, she provides him with particle data, if he asks wave questions, her wave responses will induce him to create a wave-based view of the world, etc.
The same scientifi c insight, relativizing conventional science and putting it in its proper place, ca n be foun d in modern biology, in the form of radical constructivism. Percept ion is no longer deemed a passive reception of data coming to us through t he senses from an allegedly objective world outside, but rather a reconstruction process run by the subject, depending on it s disposition, interest, history, etc. Accordingly, dogmatic concepts, such as truth, reality, or objectivity, are replaced here by the pragmatic criterion of viability, i.e. the test, if an idea or conception actually works in pract ice or not.
Modern theory of science addresses these issues in a more general but equally uncompromising way. While positivism, critical rationa lism (Popper), and general constraints of methodology have been effectively refuted (Feyerabend), in mathematics, for exam ple, the establishment of the incompleteness theorems demonstrated the inherent limitation of all axiomatic systems (Goedel), and w ithin philosophical logic it could be shown that any science rest s on presuppositions that ca nnot rationally be derived by itself (Collingwood). Pi oneered by the elaboration of " thought st yles" and " thought collectives" underlying any socalled scientific fact (Fleck), in epistemology today it is widely accepted that science is basically a social process, operating successfully wit hin t he scope of certain paradigms, which, however, have no absolute va lidity but can be and in fact were changed from time to time, as can be shown in the history of science (Kuhn).
Theory of medicine, inspired by these insights, has emerged and developed significantly during t he second half of the last century. Contrary t o the conventional assessment of medicine as nothing but an applied natural science, it has now become cogent that medicine has to be co nsidered as a pra ctical science in its own right, corresponding to the traditional concept of an art of healing. Since medicine is primarily centered around the assignment of the physician to help t he patient, i.e. around his duty to act or to give advice, acquisition of knowledge can never be a detached goal in itself, but has a secondary stat us, as a means to facilitate the primary aim of beneficent action.
Apart fro m the analysis of its current status, modern theory of medicine has also developed concrete models to broaden its approach, and t he comprehension of its genuine object, the human being. To that end the suggestion has been made t o introduce t he concept of subjectivity, i.e. the human su bject, into medicine (Weizsacker). Along these new lines of thinking, t he biopsychosocial model of man (Uexkuell) was expounded as a possibility to perceive and to treat th e patient as a un ity of physiological, mental, and socia l levels of existence, as well as of a human subject and his individual environment. Contrary to th e conventional reification of man as a mechanistic physico-chemica l machine, here, life, illness, and healing of the patient are understood in terms of processes of meaning, functional cycles, situational cycles (as I explained in my paper presented at the European Congress of Homeopat hy, in Riga, Latvia, in May ofthis year).
By means of this dynamic model of man, w hich today in th e science of theory of medicine is considered to be one of the most soph isticated and consistent, the practice of homeopaths may be described and understood in a most suit able and illuminative way. Instead of taking materia l entities, such as human bodies, diseased organs, and medical substances, as a ba sis of t hinking, t he fu nctional, cybernetic, and semiotic approach to the phenomena of th e living, advocated here, can acknowledge patients as living beings constructing their world and actual state by t heir performance of attributing and processing meaning. For example, when t he patient is in a state requiring a certain remedy, the physicia n, having figured out t his need by means of a semiotic interpretation of his symptoms, offers that remedy and the patient, by performing a fu nct ional cycle of processing t he remedy's information, ultimately cu res himself. Thu s, not the remedy heals the patient, but the patient himself (by means of the remedy), because he is the only living act or in this process. And it is not the disease or the symptoms that determine the right remedy, but the physician, because acts, such as finding and choosing a remedy, ca n only be accompl ished by a living being.
The most striking difference of this sound and up-to-date model of man, in comparison to t he convent ional materialistic one, is that it can re present and explain what homeopaths are doing in a scientific way, yet without being handicapped by materialistic objections and skepticism. When processes of meaning are primary in the world of t he living, it appears to be absolutely secondary w hether information perceived and processed by a sick patient is physical, chemical, or virtual, as long as it exactly represents the meaning upon which the patient is fixated in his current state or process. In addition, the terms and concepts suggested by the biopsychosocial model might provide a valuable tool for homeopaths to scientifically clarify and specify their own understanding.
History of medicine
But how is it that this most advanced and scientific view of man is nothing like as well known and widespread in the medical community as the conventional, comparatively trivia l, materialistic one? To answer this second paradox, we have to leave the medical and the natural sciences for a moment and consider the social and moral sciences, the so-called humanities, as well.
From the perspective of sociology, humans are social beings, i.e. they associate and socialize, building up societies-in a specific way. While conventional sociology naively used to examine societ ies, as if they were neutral objects of research for independent scientific observers, new and critica l approaches are stressing the mutual interdependence between individual subjects and society as a whole. Since a society is not an aggregation of material things, but the resu lt of mental processes of mea ning, performed both individually and co llectively, its form an d existence depend on its own reconst ruction process by it s subjects, who in turn are co nstituted and influenced by an incessant collective construction and upholding of meanings.
An example from communication science may make this point a bit clearer. Exceeding the conventional linguistic approach with its analyses of words and phrases, as if they were objective entities, from an advanced critical perspective, language appears to be a social ph enomenon. lt needs intersubj ectivity, i.e. dialogue partners, and can not be created or developed by a solipsisti c person on a lonely island. Even a hermi t can only conve rse with himself or with his God, if he has learned to speak in a socia l fram ework before: in contact with his mother, family, friends, or colleagues. We are actually born into our language, it is first and we are second. That way, it constitutes us as nat ive speakers of German (as in my and Hahnemann's case). or of English, Hindi etc. Language is a process of meaning, whose actuality depends on the performance an d participation of its speakers. On t he other hand, to understand what language is, one cannot approach it from outside, from an allegedly neutral position, but one has to participate.
Applied to homeopathy, these intermediate results fro m critica l socia l sciences suggest the conc lusion t hat analogously there can be no way to understand homeopathy without participation, i.e. without truly practici ng it. Nevertheless, when language, science, and homeopathy are social processes of meaning, the questions arise: What kind of meaning is being processed, an d in what mode and manner?
At first glance, economic science does not seem to have anything to do with this issue, but taking a deeper look, it turns out t hat economy has a tremendous impact on virtually every realm of our lives, from t he way we view ourselves to the way we run our sciences.
Conventional economics, as it is taught at universi ties and business schools, claims to explain economy in terms of scarcity of goods, practica l constraints, and money as a medium for exchange, as if com modities, salesmen, and markets have been existi ng ever since. Egoistic self-interest of people is not scrutinized, but presupposed and thus sanctioned, while econom ic problems are examined and t reated in a way an engineer would analyze and fix a machinery running independently of himself. To be sure, this seemingly objectivistic view serves as a plea for the freedom of the market, as well as does the ideology first suggested by Adam Smith in the 18th century, that a kind of invisibl e hand would transform the resu lts of selfish economic players into the wealth of nations. Meanwhile, however, financial and economic crises all over the world have sufficiently shown that this is not the case.
Trying to get to the bottom of t he issue, howeve r, it t urns out that money is not a thing, a substance, or anyt hing ow ning an int rin sic value, bu t just a fo rm of thinking, a mode by means of which people socia li ze in modern cap italistic societies. Just as we always find ourselves in the midst of the language spoken in our country, we always find ourselves in t he midst of a specific form of thinking in terms of money. As we cannot learn to speak without participati ng and thus accepting the language spoken in our infant environment, our mother tongue, we also cannot learn to think and ca lculate without participating and accepting the logic of money as the origin of ou r basic logica l categories.
Together with the insights of critical sociology, th eory of scie nce, constructivism, etc., this means, that our view of the world in wh ich we live is mainly constituted by our thinking in terms of money, since all ou r thought processes have ever since been infiltrated with money as a form of thinking. lt is only because money is nothing more t han an abstract form of thinking, that it can actually transform everything it touches into a commodity. Contrary to living beings or physical goods, however, money is free of any qualitative attributes, it is bare abstract quantity, yet can be augmented by smart trading, but also by means of interest. Wh ile natural resources cannot be infinitely proliferat ed, money can or, at least, has th e inherent tendency to do so.
Hence, in capita list civilizations t he basic intention pervading all realms o f li fe and culture, the utmost incentive, end, and merit is the turnover and multiplication of money, called economic growth. To that aim, everything and everybody has to be considered to be a mea ns for financial ga in. That is why physicians, as well as pharmaceutical companies (if they like it or not), have to use patients as a mea ns to make money, why scientists (if they like it or not) have to deliver results that meet the expectations of t heir sponsors, and why needs for new products are incessantly created by advertising targeted at the acquisition of new customers. In fact, the gross domestic product, i.e. the grade of monetization of as many areas of life as possible, is cons idered an indicator of the standard of living in that country. The gross domestic product, however, is only a quantitative measurement, ignoring all the qualitative dimensions life may have.
The predominance of money, however, is not inevitable and is not an ant hropological co nstant or similar. The science of history can show that thi s wa s not always the case, at least not to t his extre me degree. In conventional historiography, as a ru le, greediness for money is imputed to all epochs likewise or ignored entirely. By means of a comparative approach, however, involving the history of economics as well, it becomes obvious, how many profound and dramatic cultural and scientific changes had occurred in strict correlation with the rise of modern monetary thinking during the last centuries, up to the present.
Roughly speaking, during the Middle Ages agri cu lture and subsistence economy prevailed and money, in the form of gold or silver coins, played no prominent role, except at the courts of dukes and kings. The majority of people lived, worked, ate and drank and helped each other mainly without interposing money or fin ancial calculation upon their actions. The sick and inva lid were cared for in their families or in hospices of fraternities or monasteries, and healers were payed in kind . As soon as the first stock market s were founded and bank notes printed, however, a hitherto unknown disquietness, agitation, and dynamic emerged, aroused by the incentive to proliferate money and wealth by establishing new trade connections. This resulted in the discovery and conquest of new continents, colonization and slavery, as well as exploitation and contamination of nature.
lt was in the wake of th ese fundamental changes of living, striving, and judging, triggered by the new status of money as the predominate form of thinking, that the modern natural sciences emerged, by means of an explicit emancipation from traditional teleological thinking. Since Francis Bacon, in th e 17· century, the basic attitud e of modern scientists towards nature is no longer respect and the wish to live in harmony with her, but the t emptation to prise out her secret s (wit h screws and clam s) and control her, because money can be made with inventions based on knowl edge ga ined in that fashion. Quantification, mathematization, standardization, reproducibility, materialism, positivism, reductionism, etc., i.e. concepts on wh ich conventional modern science, and from the 19· century, conventional modern medicine are essentia lly found ed, would not make sense w ithout the context of the socialization process in terms of money in modern capitalistic societies. To indigenous cultures, these concepts must seem absurd.
Another side effect of th e dominance of money, as a form of thinking, was the acceleration and concentration of all activities in life. Th is can be shown in cultural studies, provided they are done critically. After th e medieval ban on usury (gombeen) was eroded and finally abandoned, as a factor for earning (or loosing) money by means of interest, the significance of t ime rose tremendously in public awareness. Eventually, time was actually equated with money. Clocks and watches became omnipresent, physiological t ime was replaced by chronometry, and clockworks became the paradigm for any kind of scientific mechanism. Besides space, t ime ca n also be, and in fact has been, exploited by chargi ng it with ever new opportunities to make money. In a civilizat ion, where consumers are wid ely saturated with durabl e material goods, such as refrigerators, ca rs, or TVs, markets increasingly prompt people to consume ever more in ever less time. For exam ple, simultaneously ta lking on th e phone, using one's computer, list ening to the radio, reading a newspaper, having a coffee, etc. This kind of t ime com pression, known under the euphemism " multitasking", is a direct outcome of the dominance of money in capitalist civilizations. Meanwhile, its undesirable effects have also reached medical schools and medical offices.
Not even the science of philosophy, i.e. th e self-reflection of the mind, is free from t he impact of money as a form of thinking. Tra nscend ing conventional philosophy as nothing but a history of philosophers, a crit ical radicalized approach may discover that the term "ratio" derives f rom th e financial accounting of the merchants of the Roman empire. Wit h this insight, howeve r, the co ncept of rationalism, with its corollaries, such as enlightenment, progress, emancipati on, etc., may appear in a new light. To speak of progress, for example, one has to know, wh ere to go or, at least, what is good. In a world dominated by money as the prevailing form of thinking, however, th e only answer would be: good is what results in economic growth. Other dimensions of life would be missed. Since th e 19· century, philosophers were increasingly taken in by concepts of dynamics, progression, enhance ment, etc., w ithout rea lizing th eir own status as subjects (media) of th e spirit of the age rather th an creators of new philosophies.
Also the modern concept of autonomy eventually t urns out to be a delusion of the modern subject, which wa s constituted w hen Rene Descartes, in the 17th cent ury, coined the formula "ego cogito, ergo sum" {I think, hence, I am). At a time, when people started to pin their hopes on money rath er than on t heir personal relations with fellow human beings, with t he first stock market crashes, the faith in the abstract value of money was always mixed wi th fear of loss. Thi s existential doubt, pervading modern t imes in an ever increasing manner, was Descartes's starting point. His conclusion, however, the alleged certainty of his subj ectivity, was self-deception, as his imaginary autonomous ego was still dependent on social processes, such as speaking, t hinking in terms of money, and calculating. In fact, the conce pt of an abstract subject thrown back on itsel f is the very result of a general thinking process in t erms of money and its uncertai nty.
Even the science of ethics is infiltrated by rational ity in terms of monetary t hinki ng. From the 18· ce ntury, for example, in utilita rianism it has been argued t hat an action is ethi ca l when it maximizes th e overall good of the great est number of individuals. From th e 19· century, in Social Darwinism the fact of struggle for existence, as observed at cap italist market s, was attributed to th e animal kingdom, to f inally deduce it from there and thus justify unsocial policies. According to modern ethics committees, in critica l situations the interests of all players (economic, financial, socia l, famil ial interests) are to be negot iated according to the paradigm of bargain at the marketplace. In such a framework, however, human dimensions, such as love, faith: duty, guilt, shame, virtues, etc. can only be perceived as factors among others and thu s misunderstood and devaluated.
Fi nal ly, also in theology we can see the global development being reflected. Th e Christian conceptualization of God as an eternal, unchangeable substance or essence was perfectly plausible (up to the Middle Ages) as long as life on earth conformed and co rresponded to it. After economic fa lls of grace, such as the sel ling of indulgences, and reformation, i.e. rationalization of religion, in the wake of industrialization and acceleration of life, contemplation was lost and competing individual interests required a new civic moral, including strategies to survive on merciless markets, such as ca nting and pretend ing. The conce pt of truth, and with it its warrantor God, was thus challenged and ultimately abandoned. Fried rich Nietzsche, t he seismograph of bou rgeois mendacity and prophet of the dawning nihilism in the 19· century, cried out the gruesome diagnosis: "God is dead and we have killed him! "
To bring all these insights from different sciences together to a uniform conclusion, we might say that in t he modern age, especially duri ng the last 200 years, the proce ss of socialization in terms of money in capitalistic civilizations has tremend ously transformed all realms and dimensions of life, including the sciences, in a way that only material things and quantitative, exploitable relations seem to be accepted as real, while everything else is being neglected, for exam ple qualities, values, or processes of meaning, which are intangible by these catego ri es. Thi s is t he reason why within conventional medicine the biopsychsocial model of man has no chance to play a significant role and why homeopat hy is still assessed from a mechanistic background only, by means of statistics and material measurements.
Homeopathy
Having affirmed this, as a third paradox the question arises, how it is at all possible both to recognize an d to free oneself of this all-embracing influence, if it really has infiltrated everybody's mind and logic.
At this point, today's homeopaths are being cha llenged to ask themselves the question: "What does it mean for me to practice homeopathy?" As a matter of fact, it is from this issue that most essential questions may arise, such as: "What am I doing?", and: "Who am I?" Here the history of homeopathy may provide t he crucial key. To be sure, any invest igation about t he essence of homeopathy has to consider its founder, Samuel Hahnemann, and his own method of healing. In contrast, conventional modern medicine is a historical, constituted, as has been shown, during the last two centuries by a variety of socio-economic conditions, incentives, and interests, and can be practiced without the need of knowing anyone of its histori c protagonists by name or cha racter. In comparison, homeopaths practice a syst em of medicine which was founded by a single hu man being-not only of fl esh and blood, but also with a soul and a spirit . This difference can hardly be overestim ated.
In antiquity, t he awareness of t his difference was still present. Aristotle's answer t o the question "What is virtuous?" was: "What a virtuous man is doing!", thus referring to the actual practice of a concrete human being, instead of risking being misled by language, logic, and other fa llacies when trying to give an abstract definition. In homeopathy, homeopaths do have a hu man paradigm who, apart from fou nding a specific method of healing, lived an exemplary moral life and, what is even more valua bl e today, still lived before the tremendous impact of rationalization in terms of money had infi ltrated all societies, cultures, and sciences, especially modern medicine. While at present everybody is socialized from infancy to a way of thinking w hose functi on is to ensure the expansion of money markets rather than to find anything like truth, delving into Hahnemann's life and work may take the student back to a bygone tim e and t o a personality rare ly found nowadays.
Of course, Hahnemann was not a saint. As a man born at the interface of two unequal epochs, he was torn between a conservative metaphysical belief in God, truth, morality, providence, unprej udiced observation, etc., and progressive scientific ambitions to found a rational method of therapeutics, with a vision of healing disease with mathematica l certainty. After initial exuberances, however, from 1819 he came back to a well-balanced concept, the art of healing (as I explained in my paper at t he Liga congress last year in Los Angeles, Ca li fornia, USA). At the same time, he noticed that an increasing number of the population were not healthy any more, but were in fact in a state of chronic disease. In 1828 he interpreted these observations as infections with a chronic miasm: psora, sycosis, or syphilis. Interestingly, this was the time when the unhealthy effects of industrialization, monetizing, acceleration, etc. were increasingly felt in Saxony (Leipzig, Koethen) as well.
Certainly, the notions and concepts of which Hahnemann could avail himself in t his day were limited. But obviously he did his very best to apply th em with the aim t o advance medical sci ence. In fact, he considered his life's work as "service at th e altar of truth" (as he put it). To be sure, without Hahnemann's noble-minded attitude and his high est imation of humanity homeopathy would not have been founded. Hence, homeopaths have a direct human paradigm to follow in term s of righteousness, trustworthiness, and uncompromising quest for truth. Wh en conventional medical doctors today are advised by non-med ical officials, such as laboratory engineers, pharmacists, attorneys, economists, politicians, etc., what to do and what to prescribe, t heir decisions are almost completely remote-controlled by monetary interests. As a counterweight, homeopaths can stil l learn from Hahnemann, how it was and how it would be when a doctor dares to think and act on his own account, vouching with his conscience and faith, while thus largely immunizing himselfto modern forms of thinking in terms of money and monetizing.
The homeopath ic method, on the other hand, provides a powerful corrective for all those whose minds are infiltrated and dominated by money as a form of thinking. All the more homeopaths, knowing that by means of the principle of similars true healings can be accomplished, should be well-disposed to avail themselves ofthis method, to heal themselves from miasms of any kind, including mental ones.
Eventually, the approach I have presented in this paper, may prove to be homeopathic in a broad sense, resembling the Buddhist or Hindu approach of reducing illusions rather than the causal-analytic one of conventional modern medicine. lt rests on the assu mption that the late-borne children of a late capitalist era have to start thinking with bewildered minds anyway, just in analogy to psoric patients whose life-force is said to be deranged. If, according to Hahnemann (in a preface to Chronic Diseases, 1838), the deranged life-force faces its enemy in the form of a slightly enlarged image, i.e. as potentized remedy, it will be resto red, will raise its energy, and the miasm will be defeated . lnstead of being dominated any more, it will regain its sovereignty.
Ana logously, modern subjects of heteronomy would have to detect their mental miasms, such as thinking in the form of money, and face them, in a condensed form, i.e. brought to the point, and in an uncompromising way, in order to get the chance to rid themselves of them, thus clearing their minds. If this happens, the homeopath will finally be able to also free homeopathy from parasitic economic interests and capitalist schemes, such as incessantly introducing new competing schools, evaluation tools, an d marketing strategies, and realize-on a conscious and scientific level-that homeopathy could also be perfectly pra cticed in subsistence economies, without significant monetary transactions on the market.
Conclusion
In conclusion, being true to Hahnemann may have more challenging consequences than just prescribing homeopathic remedies. First of all, his righteous and strong character may inspire his followers to dare to think freely and independently. Secondly, a comprehensive interpretation of his principle of similars may lead them to an extensive study-by means of all modern sciences-of the conditions which are limiting and distorting their free and faithful thinking and acting. And thirdly, if they finally recognize them and get rid of them, they free themselves as well as homeopathy, whose core has been unsettled by monetary influences in the past in an exponentially increasing way. As a coherent side-effect, the true Hahnemannian will thus embark on a way leading to the ultimate challenge of life which in ancient Greek philosophy was called : "gnothi seauton" (know yourself), corresponding to what in Vedantic Upanishads is considered the utmost wi sdom: to realize "tat twam asi" (that is you).
